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Abstract. Culinary products have culinary value. That is, they have value qua culinary products. However, what is the 
nature of culinary value and what elements determine it? In the light of the central and universal role that culinary 
products play in our lives, offering a philosophical analysis of culinary value is a matter of interest. This paper attempts 
to do just this. It develops three different possible models of culinary value, two rather restricted ones and a third 
more encompassing one, rejects the first two, and defends the third one.  
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Introduction 
The culinary domain is one of values. To wit, a culinary product (i.e., anything that can be eaten or drunk1) 
can be deemed, e.g., to taste good, be healthy, be authentic, be creative or innovative, be harm-free, be 
sustainable, or even nostalgia-inducing. These examples of purported values a culinary product can bear 
are of different kinds. Some of them are sensory (e.g., tasty), some of them are health-related (e.g., healthy), 
some of them are more aesthetic (e.g., creative), some of them are cultural (e.g., authentic), some other bear 
on the ethical (e.g., harm-free) and the political (e.g., locally sourced) while some of them are merely 
psychological (e.g., nostalgia). This diversity of values culinary products can bear raises the following general 
question: How do these different kinds of values relate to culinary products qua culinary products? In other 
words, which of these values culinary products can bear are constitutive ones and which are merely 
adventitious?  
This paper addresses this question by exploring three different culinary value models, rejecting the first 
two and endorsing the third. The structure of the paper is the following. In the first section, the preliminary 
distinction between constitutive and adventitious values is introduced. In the second section, a first model 
of culinary value, the Hedonic Model, is examined and rejected. It is replaced, in the third section, by a 
second model, the Cognitively Enriched Model.  In the fourth section, a challenge is mounted against this 
second model while the fifth section develops and defends against some objections a third option, the 
Encompassing Model.  
 
1 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, my use of the term “culinary” goes beyond a more standard one that 
covers a sub-set of what can be eaten or drunk, namely what has undergone culinary preparation or kitchen work of 
some sort. However, if indeed non-standard, I think my use can none the less be defended. On the one hand, the 
notion of “culinary preparation” is rather vague. As a result, I find it hard to establish in a non-arbitrary way a 
threshold in our dealing with ingredients beyond which it would count as “culinary preparation”. For instance, 
someone eating wild blackberries on a hike would have to, at least, identify, select, and pick them. Why wouldn’t 
that count as a form of culinary preparation, if only minimal? On the other hand, I contend that some ingredients 
very minimally prepared (e.g., just picked, delivered, and platted) but served in certain contexts (e.g., in a high-end 





1. Constitutive and Adventitious Values 
 
The question tackled in this paper is the following. Which of the valuable features a culinary product can 
possess can determine its value as a culinary product, not as something else? This question presupposes a 
distinction between two kinds of values a culinary product can bear, some that pertain to its evaluation as 
a culinary product and some that pertain to its evaluation as something else. Generalizing, for any item i of 
a kind K that bears a set of values S, we can distinguish between two kinds of values within S: a) constitutive 
values and b) adventitious values. A value v of an item i of kind K counts as a constitutive iff v is a value that 
bears on the evaluation of i qua K. On the other hand, a value v of an item i counts as adventitious iff v is a 
value that does not bear on the evaluation of i qua K.  
Here is a standard and hopefully not too controversial example. Works of art can possess different 
kinds of values, some being constitutive, some being merely adventitious. The artistic value of an artwork 
(however one wishes to conceive of it2) counts as constitutive. But artworks can also bear investment value, 
and even if there can be some causal relation between the artistic value of a work and its investment value, 
it is, admittedly, not the case that the investment value of an artwork is constitutive of its value qua artwork.  
Generalizing from this example, for any kind of thing, we can ask the following question:  
 
(Q) For any kind of thing K, which values count as constitutive of K and which count as merely 
adventitious?   
 
The question tackled in this paper is a particular instance of (Q), where the kind K under scrutiny is the one 
of culinary product, i.e., anything that can be eaten or drunk. In other words, it is an inquiry into the nature 
of culinary value and, as we shall see, it is far from straightforward. This should not come out as surprising. 
Indeed, even if culinary products answer basic and universal needs, they bear quite a lot of cultural and 
personal significance. As a result, they quickly get entangled in complex networks of values. The aim will 
be to determine which values among this network are properly culinary and which are merely adventitious.  
 
2. The Hedonic Model 
 
By nature, culinary products are consumables. Hence, the most obvious reasons for their being praised or 
criticized have to do with their consumption (to be understood in a broad sense, as we will see below) and 
with the hedonic feelings of pleasure and displeasure to which it is conducive. This will constitute the basis 
of the first model of culinary value to be scrutinized, the Hedonic Model. I start by introducing some 
terminology before discussing the model itself.  
 
2 For recent discussions of artistic value, see McIver-Lopes 2018 and Stecker 2019. 
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I will call the properties relevant to our valuing culinary products qua consumables consumable 
properties and distinguish between two sub-kinds of such properties: nutritional properties and experiential 
properties. Nutritional properties are the properties of culinary products that pertain to a culinary product's 
contribution to our survival's necessary conditions. However, we don't consume culinary products with the 
sole aim of maintaining our physiological equilibrium. Besides, we also are interested in culinary products 
because they often are conducive to hedonic sensory experiences, i.e., pleasant—and sometimes less 
pleasant—sensory experiences. I shall refer to such hedonic experiences as consumption experiences, and 
experiential properties are the properties of culinary products conducive to them.  
 I will also distinguish between two kinds of consumption experiences. First, consumption 
experiences are characterized by the experiential component of hunger and the hedonic feelings associated 
with our release from it. Second, consumption experiences are characterized by the experiential aspect of 
discriminating sensory properties as part of the experience of consuming culinary products and the hedonic 
feelings that come with it. In that respect, consumption experiences are of two kinds: non-discriminative 
(release from hunger) and discriminative (discrimination of sensory properties). And experiential properties 
are of two kinds as well: non-discriminative (power to release from hunger) and discriminative (power to be 
conducive to a particular sensory experience).  
It is also worth pointing that the Hedonic Model is compatible with a rich conception of 
discriminative consumption experiences, by which I mean two different but complementary things. On the 
one hand, it is compatible with the idea that consumption experiences comprise the discrimination of 
sensory properties of culinary products in several sensory modalities at once. That is, we see, touch, smell, 
taste, and maybe also hear features of culinary products and, hence, discriminative consumption experiences 
comprise the discrimination of a vast array of olfactory, gustatory, haptic, visual, and auditive properties. 
Hence, a consumption experience is not just the result of discriminating some properties of a culinary 
product as a result of ingesting it: it is an encompassing sensory encounter with a culinary product. On the 
other hand, it is also compatible with the idea that discriminative consumption experiences are multimodal 
in a stronger sense. That is, in the sense of being conducive to discrimination of sensory properties that 
result from emerging sensory properties and sensory modalities. Here, a clear case is flavor, conceived as a 
sensory property that emerges from different sensory properties such as olfactory, gustatory, and haptic, 
and their related sensory modalities (see, e.g., Smith 2013; Spence 2017; O'Callaghan 2019).3 
Without a doubt, there is a close relation between the culinary value of a culinary product and its 
consumable properties, both nutritional and experiential. For instance, we value frozen pizza or Gruyère 
cheese because of their nutritional and experiential properties. Some eaters might also be disposed to 
attribute more culinary value to Gruyère than to frozen pizza by pointing out that Gruyère's subtle floral and 
salty experiential properties can be conducive to a richer consumption experience than the one that results 
from eating a greasy and bland frozen pizza.  
 
3 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to say more about the multisensory aspect of consumption 
experiences.   
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But what is the exact nature of the relation between consumable properties, both nutritional and 
experiential, and culinary value? In particular, are nutritional and experiential properties the full, or only 
partial, determinants of culinary value? For instance, are the reasons why some value Gruyère cheese more 
than frozen pizza qua culinary products exhausted by pointing to how these products can be conducive to 
nutritional equilibrium and to non-discriminative and discriminative consumption experiences? 
The most basic model of culinary value—the Hedonic Model—answers this question positively. 
It results from the endorsement of two complementary claims. Unsurprisingly, the first one is that 
nutritional and experiential properties are the full determiners of culinary value. As a result, the reasons for 
which a culinary product can be said to possess a value, whether positive or negative, rest on its power to 
sustain life and to be conducive to non-discriminative and discriminative consumption experiences. 
However, this first claim alone is not sufficient to capture the Hedonic Model. A second one is 
crucial for understanding the logical space of culinary value and wherein the Hedonic Model fits: namely, 
that the valuable aspects of experiential properties are exhausted by their power to determine the hedonic 
components of a consumption experience. Accordingly, the way experiential properties can play a role in 
determining culinary value is restricted to their role in determining a certain hedonic feeling that is part of 
the consumption experience, however sensorily rich is that experience4.  
These two claims play slightly different roles. The first one determines the metaphysical basis of 
culinary value: nutritional and experiential properties. The second one specifies what this metaphysical basis 
can determine, i.e., consumption experiences to be evaluated in purely hedonic terms. As a result, according 
to the Hedonic Model, a culinary product's culinary value is a function of its contribution to physiological 
equilibrium and consumption experiences. This function's nature is likely to be rather complex, as it is hard 
to come up with a clear conception of how nutritional and consumable properties interact to determine 
culinary value. However, its consequence is clear: there cannot be determiners of culinary value beyond 
properties conducive to survival and (dis)pleasure.  
Is the Hedonic Model plausible? It is probably true that it constitutes anyone's default conception 
of culinary value. Whatever reasons we possess to positively or negatively evaluate culinary products, their 
nutritional and experiential properties—and especially how the latter can be conducive to hedonic sensory 
 
4 By this, I mean that the Hedonic Model doesn’t make much of the potential richness of discriminative sensory 
experiences. In particular, the Hedonic Model only takes into account the way consumption experiences, whether 
weakly or strongly multimodal, are conducive to a hedonic feeling. This creates a problem for the Hedonic Model that 
I won’t pursue in the rest of the paper for lack of space, but that seems important to flag.  According to the Hedonic 
Model, the multisensory aspect of consumption experience can only be factored in hedonic sensory terms. But the 
multisensory nature of consumption experiences makes them poised for features of evaluation that go beyond hedonic 
sensory aspects, such as meta-cognitive reflections on sensory experience. Take recipes that play on colors and shapes 
to create consumption expectations that are then overturned (for discussion of such cases, see Spence 2017, Chap. 1). 
For example, take a savory recipe whose instances look just like instances of a sweet dish, thereby creating an 
expectation of sweetness overturned by actually tasting the dish. In such a case, a cognitive emotion like surprise or 
even satire can be said to be part of the recipe’s culinary value. And, certainly, these cognitive elements of the culinary 
value of the recipe are properly consumable ones. That is, it is the consumption experience that is supposed to be a 
surprising and satiric one. As I argue in Author 2020, this meta-cognitive aspect and its influence on culinary value is 
a central feature of modernist cuisine and its descendants.  
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experiences—certainly do stand among them. However, there are good reasons to believe that it fails as an 
account of culinary value. Specifically, I will argue that it is conceptually flawed as it confuses what I will 
call consumption value with genuine culinary value and mistakenly identifies the latter with the former. Indeed, 
even if there is no principled reason to deny that there is indeed a kind of value attached to culinary products 
in the way presumed by the Hedonic Model, it is a mistake to identify this value with culinary value. 
Consumption and its results are one thing, culinary value is another, and whatever relation can obtain 
between them, it cannot be identity.  
I will introduce the distinction through a simple example, although the argument could also be 
made with richer forms of consumption experiences. Imagine that you are presented with two pieces of 
cheese identical in terms of their consumable properties: whichever piece of cheese is the object of your 
consumption experience, the resulting nutritional equilibrium and consumption experience, in all its 
multisensory complexity and including its hedonic component, will be the same. Let us call this value that 
the two pieces of cheese share their consumption value. Now, if the Hedonic Model were correct, then it 
would follow from this scenario that these two pieces of cheese would also share their culinary value, as 
this first model simply identifies consumption and culinary values. However, imagine further that one piece 
of cheese is a sample of authentic Gruyère cheese while the other one is a lab-produced one that reproduces 
exactly the consumable properties of its authentic counterpart5. Would we be prone to say that these two 
pieces of cheese share both their consumption and culinary values? 
The intuition this thought experiment intends to trigger is the following. One might agree with the 
claim that the two pieces of cheese share a same value as, after all, they share all their consumable properties, 
both nutritional and experiential. But one might feel uneasy about framing this equivalence in terms of 
culinary value. Indeed, one might think that some further factors, such as, e.g., its ability to express terroir, 
also pertain to the determination of the culinary value of a culinary product. The problem is that the 
Hedonic Model cannot make room for this uneasiness as it identifies consumption and culinary values. 
Therefore, one might take this fact as a sufficient motivation to explore the nature of culinary value beyond 
the Hedonic Model—what, as we shall see in the next section, several authors have been convinced to do 
in the recent past.  
 
3. The Cognitively Enhanced Model 
 
Since the Hedonic Model consists in the conjunction of two claims, we can point to at least two different 
sources for its problematic identification of consumption and culinary value. I shall discuss the first one 
here and the second one in the next section. 
 
5 In other words, I agree here with Matthew Strohl’s account of culinary authenticity, according to which “replication 
[of perceptible qualities] cannot be all there is to authenticity” and that additional “provenance requirements” matter 
for determining the authenticity of a culinary product (Strohl 2019 : 162). Note also that I agree with Strohl that 
authenticity is, in itself, “value neutral” (Strohl 2019: 163). As I will make clear in the next section, what matters for 
culinary value is not authenticity itself, but further aspects of culinary products for which authenticity serves as a 
necessary condition.  
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The first story goes like this. The Hedonic Model turns out to be correct in its contention that 
nutritional and experiential properties fully determine culinary value. Indeed, as mentioned above, culinary 
products are consumables by nature. Therefore, their valuable properties qua culinary products must be a 
function of features strictly related to their consumption, i.e., their nutritional and experiential properties 
and consumption experiences thereof. That being said, it is mistaken in claiming further that the valuable 
aspects of consumable properties are exhausted by their power to determine the hedonic components of a 
consumption experience. There is more to the value of a consumption experience than pleasure and 
displeasure. 
At this point, we need to operate a crucial conceptual distinction between a) consumable properties 
in a strict sense and b) consumable properties in an extended sense. We can conceive of them as follows. 
Generally speaking, consumable properties in a strict sense are the ones that possess the power to determine 
a basic consumption experience, where a consumption experience is basic if its properties result from, at 
most, mere sensory discrimination of its consumable properties. Consumable properties in an extended 
sense, on the other hand, possess the power to determine not only a consumption experience in a basic 
sense but, rather, in an overall sense that goes beyond the mere sensory discrimination of its consumable 
properties.  
With this distinction in place, we can now say the following: two culinary products could share 
their consumption properties in a strict sense yet differ with respect to their consumable properties in the 
extended sense. For instance, the above two pieces of cheese could share the same consumable properties 
in a strict sense while differing with respect to their consumable properties in an extended sense.  
Operating this distinction is crucial for the inquiry into the nature of culinary value. Indeed, it 
allows us to distinguish between consumption and culinary value without adding more to the metaphysical 
basis of culinary value than nutritional and consumable properties. Indeed, in the light of this distinction, 
we can claim that consumption value is determined solely by nutritional properties and consumable 
properties in the strict sense. In contrast, the determination of culinary value must take into account 
consumable properties in the extended sense. But how exactly can consumable properties in the extended 
sense determine culinary value as distinct from consumption value? 
Here is one way this could work. Philosophers generally distinguish between two kinds of sensory 
experiences: a) purely sensory ones and b) cognitively penetrated ones. In the first case, a sensory experience 
is entirely determined by mere sensory discrimination of sensory properties—in the case of a consumption 
experience, this would correspond to a consumption experience entirely determined by nutritional and 
consumable properties in the strict sense. In the second case, the sensory experience can be jointly 
determined by both sensory discrimination and some cognitive factor impinging on it.  
A standard example of cognitive penetration of sensory experience is the role that concepts play 
in visual experience. Take two subjects, S1 and S2, simultaneously looking at a blue jay standing on a branch 
from the same position in space with, however, one crucial difference: only S2 possesses the recognitional 
concept "blue jay," i.e., can perform the recognitional judgment that a certain bird is a blue jay when she 
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sees one. Now, in a de re sense, it is correct to say that both S1 and S2 are visually sensing the same thing, 
i.e., the way the blue jay looks from their shared perspective. However, in a de dicto sense, it is only correct 
to attribute to S2 an experience as of visually sensing a blue jay, as only S2 would take her visual experience 
as being one of a blue jay.  
This general example shows the following: cognitive factors can impinge on a sensory experience's 
overall nature. One way they can do so is that a same property discriminated sensorily can, in the absence 
or presence of an additional cognitive factor, be experienced differently, e.g., as an appearance of that bird 
or of that blue jay.  
This basic distinction between non-cognitively and cognitively penetrated sensory experiences can 
be applied to our experiences of culinary products. Indeed, one might say that even though the two pieces 
of cheese of the above thought experiment share the same consumable properties in a strict sense, they 
possess different consumable properties in an extended sense. Indeed, if one were to taste the two pieces 
of cheese with the background knowledge of which piece of cheese is which, then even though one would 
discriminate the same sensory properties in a strict sense in both cases, one could still experience different 
sensory properties in an extended sense. Accordingly, only the authentic piece of Gruyère could be 
experienced correctly as a piece of authentic Gruyère, and only the lab-sourced piece of cheese could be 
experienced correctly as a piece of lab-sourced cheese.  
As a result, we could distinguish between the two pieces of cheese in terms of the kind of correct 
cognitively penetrated experiences to which they could give rise. For instance, correctly experiencing the 
authentic piece of Gruyère as a piece of Gruyère could have a decisive impact on one's consumption 
experience. This experience would be correctly individuated as an experience of authentic Gruyère cheese 
and not an experience of lab-sourced cheese, even though the two pieces of cheese would share all of their 
nutritional properties and consumable properties in a restricted sense. We could then be tempted to use 
that fact to claim that part of what makes these two experiences different is that they turn out to be 
experiences of different culinary values despite being experiences of the same consumption value. 
Here is a concrete way this idea could work. When experiencing the two pieces of cheese, one is 
acquainted with the same consumable properties in the strict sense. Still, when one undergoes a correctly 
cognitively penetrated experience of tasting an authentic piece of Gruyère cheese as a piece of Gruyère cheese, 
then a certain expressive power of the piece of cheese is becoming manifest. In such a case, one can 
experience the cheese's gustatory profile as an expression of the cheesemaker's intentions or expression of 
a specific terroir, Gruyère cheese being exclusively produced with the milk of grass-fed cows from a restricted 
geographical area. In other words, an authentic piece of Gruyère could be said to possess a distinct kind of 
consumable properties, i.e., expressive ones, and experiencing them in a correctly penetrated way could be 
said to make them manifest.  
In the case of the lab-source piece of cheese, we could either deny it any such kind of expressive 
power or grant it expressive power, but distinguish what it would thereby be able to express, e.g., the capacity 
of a lab to reproduce an artisanal taste and the intentions of a marketing team to piggy-bag on it. We could 
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then either say that the lab-sourced piece of cheese possesses less culinary value than its authentic 
counterpart because it lacks expressive value or that what it expresses is intrinsically less valuable than what 
the authentic piece can express. In any case, we would be able to distinguish between the consumption 
value that the two pieces of cheese would share and the distinct culinary values that each would bear.  
The resulting model of culinary value one would obtain from this maneuver would be the 
following. Consumption value must be distinguished from culinary value. Consumption value is determined 
by consumable properties in a strict sense, while culinary value is—or can be—determined by consumable 
properties in an extended sense. Let us call this second model the Cognitively Enriched Model. 
The Hedonic and Cognitively Enriched models are distinct, but they share a commonality: they 
contend that culinary value is fully determined by consumable properties, though of different kinds. That 
is, they take culinary value to be essentially manifested in consumption experience. According to the 
Hedonic Model, culinary value is determined by consumable properties in a strict sense, while the 
Cognitively Enhanced Model countenances the additional claim that expressive consumable properties can 
also be manifested in consumption experience and impinge on culinary value.   
Something is appealing to such a general conception of culinary value. Indeed, as mentioned above, 
it is in the nature of culinary products to be consumables. It would then be quite in order that their value 
qua culinary products is a function of their consumable properties. The Cognitively Enhanced Model, 
however, presents a significant advantage over the Hedonic one. By distinguishing between consumption 
and culinary values, it can account, e,g., for the intuition that we value differently culinary products that 
share the same consumable properties in a strict sense. Accordingly, it adds an extra element to 
consumption experience beyond mere hedonic sensory feeling, making room for gustatory experience as a 
thoughtful enterprise and, ultimately, for a richer conception of culinary value.  
Versions of this second model have been defended independently by different authors. For 
instance, in her classic Making Sense of Taste, Carolyn Korsmeyer provides many examples of what she calls 
"expressive foods" (Korsmeyer 1999: 131). One of them is the fictional story of a father tasting meat cooked 
without salt and to whom is thereby revealed the meaning of what his disgraced daughter intended to 
convey by telling him, initially much to his dismay, that she loves him "as fresh meat loves salt." In such a 
case, we might say that meat served without salt possesses distinct expressive properties and that the right 
kind of discriminative consumption experience can make these properties manifest.  
However, one distinctive feature of Korsmeyer's account is, as she admits it, that the 
representational powers she attributes to food are heavily context-dependent. This limitation has been 
challenged by different authors such as Cain Todd (Todd 2010), Matthew Adams (Adams 2018), Matteo 
Ravasio (Ravasio 2018), and Matthew Strohl (Strohl 2019), who, each in their way, argue that if a certain 
culinary product has the right kind of connection to, e.g., its production conditions, the environment, or the 
past, then the right kind of discriminative consumption experience can make manifest expressive properties 
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of these culinary products in an intrinsic way6. For instance, Ravasio argues that proper appreciation of a 
lowbrow culinary item such as Cornish pastry can make manifest some of its expressive properties. As he 
puts it,  
 
Knowledge of a food item in its historical and sociocultural situatedness is relevant to the appreciation of 
the aesthetic properties of the object in question. The resourcefulness, creativity, ingenuity of the people 
who first developed the Cornish pastry is only enlightened by such knowledge. The somewhat 
unsophisticated flavor of the pasty becomes a piece of culinary inventiveness when it is seen from the 
standpoint of the hungry Cornish miner. (Ravasio 2018: 317) 
 
However, one might be disposed to grant the point about the importance of cognitive penetration for the 
determination of culinary value and yet be suspicious of the idea that this fact requires us to endorse a new 
model of culinary value. In particular, one might suspect that the Cognitively Enhanced Model just amounts 
to an extension of the Hedonic Model. Cognitive penetration allows not for culinary value to step beyond 
the hedonic but for the hedonic to step beyond the purely sensory. When properly cognitively penetrated, 
consumption experience is more pleasurable or satisfying than its purely sensory counterpart, and culinary 
value is what such experiences acquaint us with.7 
This understanding of the Cognitively Enhanced model rests on the following claim: the relation 
between consumption value and culinary value is additive, such that whatever additional expressive value 
of a culinary product a properly cognitively penetrated consumption experience can uncover, this value 
either is of a hedonic kind or at least enhances the overall hedonic value of the experience. Culinary value, 
in that understanding, amounts to a form of pumped-up consumption value.  
The above example about authentic Gruyère cheese vs. lab-produced counterpart might lend itself 
to this interpretation. When cognitively penetrated, the consumption experience of the authentic piece of 
cheese uncovers, e.g., the taste of terroir or of a savoir-faire, that somehow infuses the experience with 
additional pleasure—the snobbish pleasure of the connoisseur, maybe. One might also be tempted to read 
the passage by Ravasio just quoted in a similar way. The cognitive penetration of the consumption 
experience of the Cornish pastry leads to a better aesthetic appreciation: what tasted unsophisticated 
becomes inventive, and more enjoyable.  
I am skeptical that this interpretation generalizes. We should be cautious not to confuse a feature 
of examples used for illustration with a necessary feature of the distinction at play. We should also be 
cautious not to confuse the question of the aesthetic value of a culinary product with the one of its culinary 
value. In that respect, the passage from Ravasio quoted above is slightly misleading. He agrees with me that 
culinary products can possess expressive properties beyond their consumable properties in a strict sense, 
but we should bear in mind that he frames his discussion in terms of aesthetic, not culinary, value. And if 
 
6 I discuss Korsmeyer’s extrinsic account in detail and offer my own take on the intrinsic representational power of 
food in Engisch (2022). 
7 Thanks to the editors for pressing me on this point and for suggesting its formulation. 
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it might be plausible to claim that the aesthetic value of a Cornish pastry or a piece of authentic Gruyèere 
amounts to a pumped version of its consumption value, it remains open whether their culinary value is to 
be understood in the same way.  
One reason to doubt that culinary value doesn't work that way comes from cases that we might 
reasonably interpret as not following this model. For instance, take the case of consumption experiences 
of dishes produced by retro-engineered recipes, i.e., recipes reconstructed on the basis of chemical analysis 
of archeological remains. Sometimes, these can hardly be said to have great consumption value because, 
e.g., they display tastes far too pungent for our contemporary palates (see Korsmeyer 2022 for discussion). 
But if the hedonic interpretation were correct, we would be forced to claim that, when properly cognitively 
penetrated, such experiences become more pleasurable or satisfying than their non-cognitively penetrated 
counterparts. I think the following interpretation fares better. Cognitive penetration doesn't affect 
consumption value, which remains the same, but it affects culinary value. Once cognitively penetrated, the 
consumption experience uncovers an expressive property of the dish, being expressive of the past. The 
additional values displayed in such cases are cognitive, not hedonic ones, and they also don't necessarily 
enhance the overall hedonic value of the experience. They make the experience more interesting, not more 
pleasurable or satisfying. Hence, the conception of culinary value advocated by the Cognitively Enhanced 
Model cannot be collapsed in a mere extension of the Hedonic Model.  
This move from the Hedonic to the Cognitively Enhanced model is clearly on the right track. One 
might wonder, however, whether it goes far enough. In the next section, I challenge the Cognitively 
Enhanced Model before, in the fifth section, offering an alternative that, though strictly compatible with 
the Cognitively Enhanced Model, also extends the basis of the determination of culinary value beyond 
consumable properties. 
  
4. Culinary Value Beyond Consumable Properties 
 
Why be tempted to go beyond the Cognitively Enhanced Model? The main reason is that one might doubt 
that all the elements that can pertain to the culinary value of a culinary product fall within the range of its 
consumable properties, either in a restricted or in an extended sense. Or so I shall argue in this section. 
Here is the argument I intend to defend:  
 
1) Culinary products have constitutive values, i.e., culinary values.  
2) Culinary value is determined by consumable properties if what makes a culinary product valuable 
qua culinary product is determined by the value of the consumption experience that results from 
acquaintance with these consumable properties.  
3) There are instances of culinary products whose culinary value is determined, at least in part, 
independently of consumable properties.  
4) Hence, culinary value is not fully determined by consumable properties.  
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As made clear by premise 3), the argument is supposed to work by examples. I will discuss one such example 
and defend my interpretation as supporting 3) against possible objections.  
The example concerns, again, the case of Gruyère cheese. Authentic Gruyère, i.e., Gruyère cheese 
officially recognized as part of the Gruyère geographical indication, comes in several kinds. At one extreme, 
one finds Gruyère d'alpage, a cheese made in mountainous regions where cheesemakers and their cows spend 
the summer months in relatively isolated, often rudimentary, secondary housings. The milk is produced and 
transformed on-site and is sometimes still boiled on a good old wooden fire. The resulting quantities of 
cheese are small, the work is hard, but the end product possesses a distinctive culinary value. At another 
extreme, one finds quasi-industrial Gruyère, a cheese produced in large quantities in a standardized form in 
industrial cheese factories. The resulting quantities of cheese are much more important, the work greatly 
helped by technology, and the resulting product, though still of great culinary value, is arguably not on a 
par with its Alpage counterpart. But what determines this difference in culinary value?  
One might argue that the difference in consumable properties in a strict sense plays only a restricted 
role in such a case. Indeed, independently of its mode of production, one will be able to find Gruyère with 
astonishing consumption value. What about its consumable properties in an extended sense? Here one 
might be more optimistic in their ability to explain the difference in culinary value between the two kinds 
of cheese. Indeed, one might argue that differences in the intentions of the respective cheesemakers (e.g., 
one cheesemaker might be aiming for idiosyncratic wheels of cheese, the other one for consistency) or 
differences in terroir must be taken into account, and that as a result, the two kinds of cheese possess 
different culinary values in a way that the Cognitively Enhanced Model can accommodate. However, there 
are further differences between these two kinds of authentic Gruyère that one might regard as impinging on 
their culinary value, and that might not fit as well the Cognitively Enhanced model and its reliance on the 
distinction between consumable properties in a strict and extended sense.  
 Indeed, beyond features like intentions and terroir, one might also argue that these different Gruyère 
cheeses also embody different values of a more existential kind. For instance, a cheese-like Gruyère d'alpage 
isn't merely an authentic Gruyère, it is also an authentic Gruyère authentically made8. It embodies values like 
small-scale agriculture, proximity to the animals and the landscape, and self-reliance, and these values seem 
to guide us in its evaluation qua culinary product. The question is now the following. Is it plausible to claim 
that when we value a culinary product on such grounds, we do so in accordance with the Cognitively 
Enhanced Model, i.e., through acquaintance with consumable properties in a strict and extended sense? 
 One might answer this question positively and contend that when suitably cognitively penetrated, 
the consumption experience of the Gruyère d'alpage ends up being more interesting than the consumption 
experience of its merely authentic counterpart—and that this is all we need to explain the difference in 
culinary value between these two kinds of Gruyère cheeses. But is this positive answer plausible? I will offer 
 
8 For a similar distinction applied to the case of wine, see Todd 2022. 
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one reason to think that, on the contrary, it would entail stretching too much the notion of cognitive 
penetration of consumption experiences.  
Indeed, one useful way to think about cognitive penetration of sensory experience is as 
experiencing sensory objects under aspects uncovered by cognitive penetration. Differences in conceptual 
repertoire, or lack thereof, allow for differences in aspectuality thus conceived. To experience a bird as a 
blue jay is to experience it under a certain aspect, the aspect of blue jays, and to experience a piece of cheese 
as an authentic piece of Gruyère cheese is to experience it under a certain aspect, e.g., the aspect of 
authentically produced cheese.  
 However, some general conditions must pertain to the uncovering of an aspect of an object 
through a successful instance of cognitive penetration. A first, unsurprising one is that it must be the case 
that the aspect in question indeed is a feature of the object, however one may be prone to cash out the 
exact metaphysics of that claim. For instance, a cognitively penetrated experience of seeing a blue jay can 
be successful only if the bird in question indeed is a blue jay. But this can't be the full story. Another 
plausible condition is that if cognitive penetration of a sensory experience leads to the uncovering of an 
aspect of an object, then there should obtain some explanatory relation between the uncovered aspect and 
the sensory features of the object. In the authentic Gruyère cheese vs. lab-counterpart example used above, 
we can explain the aspects we might label cheesemaker's intentions or flavors of terroir in terms of the sensory 
features of the object. Namely, the cheese has certain sensory features in virtue of the cheesemaker's 
intentions or it being a product of its terroir. But here looms a problem for accounting for the further 
valuable features of Gruyère d'alpage we pointed to in terms of the Cognitively Enhanced Model. Indeed, it 
seems much less clear how there could be an explanatory relation between a supposed cognitively 
penetrated aspect that we might label expression of self-reliance and sensory features of the object. Indeed, it 
seems quite a bit of a stretch to claim that a value like self-reliance could impact a cheese in such a way that 
it can be expressed through a consumption experience. 
 Of course, my overall interpretation of this example can be challenged. In particular, the following 
straightforward objection must be considered. Even though culinary products can possess such valuable 
features independent of their consumable properties, they are determiners of values distinct from culinary 
value. For instance, in the case of the authentic Gruyère cheese authentically made, the existential values that 
it manifests pertain to it as, say, a cultural or commercial artifact, not as a culinary one. 
What should we make of this objection? Of course, it might be true that culinary products can 
possess valuable features that are determiners of non-culinary values of culinary products. But what we 
need for the object to go through is something more than this mere possibility: a plausible ground to think 
that such valuable features of culinary products independent of their consumable properties would turn out 
to be determiners of non-culinary values. Could there be such a ground? 
Here, one could attempt to find support for this objection in the following way. Existential values 
like being made authentically or cognitive values like being surprising or satirical cannot be constitutive of 
culinary value proper because they are constitutive of other values that have nothing to do with the culinary 
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world. For instance, one could rationally justify buying locally sourced knitwear from an independent 
shepherd spinning her own wool instead of anything more industrial in the light of the existential values 
that her knit products manifest.  
However, I don't think that we should give this consideration much weight. Indeed, it would be a 
bit like saying that aesthetic features cannot bear artistic value because things that aren't artworks, such as 
landscapes, can also have aesthetic value. But the fact that the aesthetic domain is wider than the artistic 
one doesn't make it such that, in principle, aesthetic features cannot have a bearing on artistic value. 
Similarly, that the existential domain is wider than the culinary one does not, in principle, make it such that 
existential features cannot have a bearing on culinary value.   
What the objection needs to go through, then, is a more principled reason to think that valuable 
features of culinary products independent of their consumable properties cannot be determiners of culinary 
value. Of course, one could deliver such a principle reason by sticking to the idea that the nature of culinary 
products is so much influenced by their being consumables that their valuable features must be consumable 
ones, and by then wheeling in either the Hedonic or the Cognitively Enriched models of culinary value. But 
this is premature. Indeed, we don't yet possess a firm enough grasp on the notion of culinary value to stick 
to such principled reasons without manifesting prejudice. The next section aims to challenge this prejudice 
and offer an account of culinary value that does away with it.  
 
5. An Encompassing Model of Culinary Value 
 
There might be more than one way to develop a model of culinary value aiming at enriching its basis beyond 
consumable properties. This section will develop a particular version of such a model based on a second-
order conception of culinary value—the Encompassing Model. In such a model, different features of 
culinary products determine various kinds of first-order values. Culinary value is then conceived as a 
second-order value that is a function of these first-order values. For instance, the culinary value of a piece 
of Gruyère d'alpage can be a function of, say, its consumption value and an existential value such as self-
reliance.  
Such a model of culinary value bears structural similarities with a certain model of artistic value, 
according to which artistic value is a second-order value (see, e.g., Stecker 2012, 2019). In that case, the main 
idea is the following. Artworks are generally praised and criticized in terms of their artistic value. However, 
in the light of the well-known diversity to be found within the class of artworks, it has been recognized to 
be quite challenging to identify a clear set of properties, i.e., the properly artistic ones, out of which the 
artistic value of an artwork could be determined. On the other hand, artworks can possess different kinds 
of values, such as aesthetic, emotional, cognitive, moral, or political ones. According to the second-order 
model of artistic value, there is a determination relation between an artwork possessing such kinds of values 
and its possessing artistic value. Artistic value is a second-order value that an artwork can possess in virtue 
of possessing other values.  
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The intuitive nature of this proposal can be made manifest as follows. Imagine someone saying of 
an artwork: "It is beautiful, creative, and politically relevant," before adding: "And of course it also has 
artistic value." There is something weird about such an assessment. For an artwork to be beautiful, creative, 
and politically relevant does not seem to be something distinct from it having artistic value. Instead, it looks 
as bearing these values is a way for this artwork to have artistic value. Once these first-order values have 
been recognized, the second-order artistic value comes from free, so to speak.  
Though independent of this conception of artistic value, the Encompassing Model of culinary 
value develops a similar idea: culinary value is a second-order value. Among these first-order values are 
ones based on consumable properties, either in a strict or extended sense. And together with other values 
independent of consumable properties, such as cognitive or existential ones, these first-order values can 
determine a second-order value of a culinary product, i.e., its culinary value. Accordingly, when one says of 
a piece of Gruyère d'alpage that it doesn't only taste great and expresses terroir, but also, e.g., manifest self-
reliance, one is listing down different first-order values that can all pertain to the determination of culinary 
value as a second-order value.  
That being said, one might be worried that, contrary to the case of artistic value, the notion that 
culinary value could be a second-order value has little bite. An asymmetry between artworks and culinary 
products seems to prevent culinary products from having their values conceived in second-order terms. 
Indeed, unlike culinary works, artworks are extremely varied, and as a result, it is not surprising that they 
end up being the bearers of many different values. However, the kind art comes with a unifying principle 
that allows understanding how these disjoint first-order values can all impinge on an artwork's artistic value. 
That is, it seems that the notion of artistic value brings some kind of unity at a second-order level while 
there is disunity at the first-order level.  
However, in the case of culinary value, it seems that the situation is very different. Indeed, under 
the assumption that culinary works could present similar disunity at the first-order level, one might be 
worried that the best one could do to come up with a unifying principle is to fall back on the notion of 
consumable properties, and hence on a conception of culinary value like the one advocated by the Hedonic 
or the Cognitively Enriched models. Accordingly, unlike the prospect of understanding artistic value as a 
second-order value, the idea of understanding culinary value as a second-order value would be doomed 
from the start. At best, it would collapse in a first-order conception of culinary value along the lines of the 
Hedonic or the Cognitively Enriched models.  
There is something to this objection. Indeed, how could one deny that, unlike artworks, culinary 
products fall within a relatively homogeneous kind and that their nature as consumables serves as a de facto 
unifying principle? That being said, I don't think that we should conclude from this that the idea of culinary 
value as second-order turns out to be impossible to get off the ground. Instead, we should distinguish the 
idea that culinary value is constitutive of culinary products homogeneously characterized by their being 
consumables and the idea that culinary value is constituted by the consumable properties of culinary 
products homogeneously characterized by their being consumables. The first claim pertains to the medium 
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of culinary value, the second one to culinary value itself. The objection under scrutiny establishes only the 
former idea, not the latter: the unity of culinary products as consumables tells us something about the rather 
strict constraints on their nature as the medium of culinary value, not yet something about the nature of 
culinary value itself. Ruling out the notion that culinary value couldn't be second-order on the idea that 
culinary products are unified by their nature as consumables amounts to nothing but falling prey to a subtle 
confusion.  
 What is true, though, is that the Encompassing Model is committed to the claim that consumable 
properties can play double duty. On the one hand, they can determine consumption value. On the other, 
they can serve as the medium of additional values, such as existential ones—and these first-order values 
can then jointly determine culinary value at the second-order level. According to the Encompassing Model, 
this claim is one of the keys to understanding culinary value's complex nature. That culinary products are 
relatively simple when understood in terms of mediums of value doesn't mean that their culinary value is 
equally simple.  
At this point, one might still agree about the distinction between consumable properties as a 
medium of value and consumable properties as determiners of culinary value, yet deny that it is culinary 
value proper, not adventitious values, that consumable properties mediate when taking up a mere mediating 
role. One might claim that culinary products are homogeneous mediums of heterogeneous first-order 
values—culinary value determined by consumable properties being one of them—rather than 
homogeneous mediums of heterogeneous first-order values that can jointly determine culinary value 
conceived as second-order. Here I want again to use the case of artworks as an analogy to understand why 
we should conceive of culinary value as second-order.  
In the case of artworks, an interesting idea is that despite the great variety of artistic mediums and of 
values they can realize, artworks are characterized by the fact that they often constitute a special avenue or 
opportunity to materialize these values, whether they are aesthetic, cognitive, emotional, moral, political, 
social, or whatever else. This idea is then closely related to the one that artistic value is a second-order value 
constituted of first-order ones. Indeed, it is because artworks have this special nature of being a special 
avenue or opportunity to materialize some values that they can be evaluated qua artworks in the way they 
materialize these values. In other words, it might be the case that even though one might be sometimes 
confounded as to what makes something an artwork, one can nonetheless make a case as to why producing 
this work is the right kind of thing to do to manifest or embody the specific value or values embodied or 
manifested in that work. One condensed way to express this idea is that, often, what we may call the "form" 
of an artwork, whatever this could mean, bears a tight fit to its content so that it would be difficult to 
express this content through a different form. And when there is such a tight fit between form and content, 
we can see how and why artistic value could be a function from disjoint and unrelated first-order values. 
My final suggestion is that we should conceive the Encompassing Model of culinary value as claiming 
that the same is true of the culinary domain. We should conceive of culinary value as a second-order value 
determined by disjoint first-order values because we can often find a tight fit between the form and content 
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of culinary value, i.e., between a culinary product and values that could hardly be expressed or embodied by 
something else. Take, for instance, the existential value of self-reliance embodied by an authentic piece of 
Gruyère cheese authentically produced. One could hardly find a better avenue to embody or manifest a value 
such as self-reliance because embodying or manifesting self-reliance in part consists in producing culinary 
products in the way such a piece of Gruyère is being made9. If this is correct, this might be the missing link 
required to seal the deal in favor of the Encompassing Model. Culinary products can keep their nature as 
consumables and be vehicles for values that aren't determined by their consumable properties. Moreover, 
these values can be constitutive of culinary value proper as culinary products constitute a special avenue or 
opportunity for these values to be embodied and manifested. Just like in the case of artworks, there is a 
tight fit between form and content that explains why multiple and disjoint values can be regarded as 




This paper aimed to examine three different models of culinary value and to offer a defense of one of them, 
the Encompassing Model. As I argued, the two other models, the Hedonic and the Cognitively Enhanced 
ones, shared a common problematic assumption: that culinary value is determined by consumable 
properties of culinary products. The Encompassing Model goes beyond this claim by arguing that culinary 
value can be determined by non-consumable properties of culinary products. A neat, and hopefully correct, 
way to see how this is possible, I argued and defended against objections, is that culinary value is a second-
order value determined by first-order values. Values determined by consumable properties of culinary 
products are to be counted among these values, of course. Still, more first-order values determine culinary 
value than just these. Hence, culinary value is an encompassing phenomenon. If true, this conclusion can 
be brought to explain the centrality of the culinary domain in our lives in a way that doesn't fall prey to the 
prejudice that displaying an interest in the culinary domain is a futile enterprise or, worse, a vice. We might 
also hope that it could help to focus further the attention of philosophers on the culinary domain.10  
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